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Abstract— Intrusion detection has attracted a considerable interest from researchers 
and industries. The community, after many years of research, still faces the problem of 
building reliable and efficient IDS that are capable of handling large quantities of data, with 
changing patterns in real time situations. The work presented in this manuscript classifies 
intrusion detection systems (IDS). Moreover, a taxonomy and survey of shallow and deep 
networks intrusion detection systems is presented based on previous and current works. This 
taxonomy and survey reviews machine learning techniques and their performance in 
detecting anomalies. Feature selection which influences the effectiveness of machine learning 
(ML) IDS is discussed to explain the role of feature selection in the classification and training 
phase of ML IDS. Finally, a discussion of the false and true positive alarm rates is presented 
to help researchers model reliable and efficient machine learning based intrusion detection 
systems. 
Keywords— Shallow network, Deep networks, Intrusion detection, False positive 
alarm rates and True positive alarm rates 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Computer networks have developed rapidly over the years contributing significantly to social 
and economic development. International trade, healthcare systems and military capabilities 
are examples of human activity that increasingly rely on networks.  This has led to an 
increasing interest in the security of networks by industry and researchers. The importance of 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) is critical as networks can become vulnerable to attacks 
from both internal and external intruders [1], [2]. 
An IDS is a detection system put in place to monitor computer networks. These have been in 
use since the 1980’s [3]. By analysing patterns of captured data from a network, IDS help to 
detect threats [4]. These threats can be devastating, for example, Denial of service (DoS) 
denies or prevents legitimate users resource on a network by introducing unwanted traffic [5]. 
Malware is another example, where attackers use malicious software to disrupt systems [6]. 
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Intrusion detection systems evolved as a response to these situations. Many IDS have been 
developed but have experienced the problem of false positive or false negative alarms. These 
are the false recognition of an attack by the IDS and increases the difficultly for network 
administrators to handle intrusion reports. Researchers in this field aim at developing IDS 
that have a high accuracy of detection and low false alarm rate [7]. Another problem of some 
existing IDS is their inability to detect unknown attack types. These IDS rely on the 
signatures of known attacks. 
Human independent IDS that incorporate machine learning techniques have been developed 
as a solution to these problems. Machine learning IDS learns from normal traffic and 
abnormal traffic by training on a dataset to predict an attack by using classification. Several 
machine learning techniques have been successfully implemented as classifiers on IDS but 
present numerous flaws such as low throughput and high false detection rates [7].  
The taxonomy (or classification) presented within this manuscript is highly relevant in the 
present study due to the highly diverse types of systems and attacks [8], [9]. The taxonomy 
will aid constructing two objectives: a clear description of the current state of IDS and the 
guide lines in which to explore the complexity of it [10], [11]. 
The paper aims to provide a clear description and guidelines needed to understand intrusion 
detection systems based on results from existing works in various papers. Its organisation 
gives a broader view of IDS and aims at addressing the concerns and solutions of shallow and 
deep learning IDS. The paper also compares previous works and their performance metrics.  
The second objective of the paper is to present a survey and the classification of Intrusion 
Detection Systems, taxonomy of Machine Learning IDS and a survey on shallow and deep 
networks IDS.  
 2.0   INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Intrusion detection systems are strategically placed on a network to detect threats and monitor 
packets. The IDS accomplishes this by collecting data from different systems and network 
sources and analysing the data for possible threats [12]. The functions of the IDS include 
offering information on threats, taking corrective steps when it detects threats and recording 
all important events within a network [13]. Figure 2 shows a model of Intrusion detection 
system 
 
Figure 2 Intrusion detection system model 
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2.1 Classification of Intrusion detection system 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Classification of Intrusion Detection Systems 
Different researchers have developed different classification representations. H.Debar et 
al[14], S.Axelsson et al.[15], S.Amer et al.[16], C.Xenakis et al.[17], Hung-Ten Lia et 
al.[18], have previously presented intrusion detection surveys and taxonomies. This research 
builds upon their work and introduces deep networks technique which all these referenced 
works do not describe. With the increasing value of big data, deep networks is an important 
element to capture in an IDS taxonomy  The taxonomy presented within this work provides a 
fine-grained overview of the different machine learning techniques for intrusion detection 
systems as shown in Figure 2.1. The detection mainly depends on the source of data and 
intrusion technique used.  The Source of data is the nodes that gather the information for 
analysis. The source can be either host or network based or both. These two sources are 
further discussed in section 2.1.1. The detection technique also differentiates between the 
anomaly based and signature based detection techniques. The different techniques that fall in 
the class of anomaly and signature based are important to develop a taxonomy that gives a 
broader view of techniques and the capabilities in detecting attacks. Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 
explains anomaly based and signature based techniques in detail. These techniques operate 
either as self-learning or programmed. In Self-learning class, the system automatically learns 
whilst in programming class a user teaches the system.  The classification presented Fig.2.1 
will help draw conclusions on detection accuracy and false alarm rates of IDS techniques.  
2.1.1 Host Based IDS (HIDS) Vs. Network Based IDS (NIDS) 
Host based IDS  were the first type of IDS to be implemented [19]. HIDS  are software based 
products installed on a host computer that analyse and monitor all traffic activities on the 
system application files and operation system [20], [21]. The traffic activities gathered by the 
system application files and system [20] are called the audit trails [22]–[24]. HIDS has an 
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advantage of being able to detect threats from within by scanning through the traffic activities 
before sending and receiving data [25]. Its main disadvantage is that  only monitors the host 
computer, meaning it has to be installed on each host [26].   
Network based IDS are found at specific points on the network to capture and analyse the 
stream of packets going through network links, unlike the HIDS whose approach is to analyse 
each host separately [27] [28], [29]. It has the advantage of having a single system 
monitoring an entire network, saving time and cost of installing software on each host. NIDS 
main disadvantage is its vulnerability to any intrusion originating from the network targeting 
a system within the network. 
Table I. Performance comparison of HIDS and NIDS [30] 
Performance in terms 
of: 
Host-Based IDS Network-Based IDS 
Intruder deterrence Strong deterrence for 
inside intruders 
Strong deterrence for outside intruders 
Threat response 
time 
Weak real time response 
but performs better for a 
long term attack 
Strong response time against outside intruders 
Assessing damage Excellent in determining 
extent of damage 
Very weak in determining extent of damage 
Intruder prevention Good at preventing inside 
intruders 
Good at preventing outside intruders 
Threat anticipation Good at trending and 
detecting suspicious 
behavior patterns 
Good at trending and detecting suspicious behavior 
patterns 
 
2.1.2 Anomaly Based Detection 
Anomaly Based Detection is a behavioural based intrusion detection system. It observes 
changes in normal activity within a system by building a profile of the system which is being 
monitored [31], [32]. The profile is generated over a period of time when the system is 
established to have behaved normally [33]. One advantage is that it offers the ability to detect 
attacks which are new to the system [34]. Anomaly detection is categorised into two, based 
on the way a normal profile of a system is specified. 
1) Self-learning – The self-learning system operate by example with a baseline set for 
normal operation. This is achieved by building a model for the underlying processes 
with the observed system traffic built up over a period of time [15]. Self-learning 
systems are sub-divided into the following main categories: time series model and 
machine learning. Section 3 discusses machine learning technique in detail. 
 Time series model takes into account the sequence of observation in order of 
succession occurring in intervals of uniformity. If the probability of 
occurrence of a new observation at a time is negligible then it is considered a 
change in normal behaviour. Time series has an advantage of observing 
trends of behaver over a period of time and flagging it, if it notices a change 
in normal behaviour. It is an effective model when attacks are sequential over 
a period of time [35]. This model has a disadvantage of being more costly 
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computationally [36]. Auto regressive moving average (ARMA) is an 
example of time series model used as IDS. 
In Predictive Modelling for Intrusions in Communication Systems using 
generalised autoregressive moving average (GARMA) and ARMA models 
by [37] et al. fitted ARMA(1,1) and GARMA(1,2;𝛿,1)  time series models to 
4 types of attacks (DoS, probe, U2R and L2R). The parameter estimation was 
done using Hannan-Rissanen algorithm, Whittle estimation and Maximum 
likelihood estimation and the point forecast obtained through Whittle 
estimation and maximum likelihood were close to the original value. The 
time series models were able to forecast the attack but the performance of 
GARMA (1, 2; 𝛿, 1) in attack detection was better.  
. 
2) Programmed – A programmed model is when a system needs either a user or an 
external person to teach the system to detect changes in behaviour. The user decides 
the extent of abnormal behaviour in the system and flags an intrusion threat [35]. The 
programmed models are grouped into four categories: threshold, simple rule based, 
and statistical models. 
 Threshold models can be considered  as the simplest programmed descriptive 
statistical detector [15]. By correlating and analysing statistical data, a user 
can program the system at a pre-defined threshold of alarm on a statistical 
variable. Careful selection of the threshold is required to minimise the false 
alarm rate. Instances where the threshold set too high leads to a risk of missing 
an alarm when  an intruder is performing a malicious action [38]. A typical 
example is setting an alarm if three attempts to login to a system are 
unsuccessful [39]. 
In anomalous payload-based network intrusion detection [40], Ke Wang et al. 
presented a payload base anomaly detection by demonstrating the 
effectiveness on 1999 DARPA dataset and a live dataset collected form the US 
Columbia CS department network. In training  phase, a profile byte frequency 
distribution was computed and the standard deviation of application payload 
connected to a single host and port. During the detection phase the 
Mahalanobis distance was used to calculate the similarity of new data against 
the pre-computed profile. The detector compared this measure against a 
threshold and generated an alert when the distance of the new input exceeded 
this threshold. It recorded nearly 100% in accuracy with 0.1% false positive 
rate for port 80 traffic. 
 Simple rule based is an approach for detection is to monitor events within a 
system that trigger a rule either than what is considered as a normal behaviour 
for the user. One limitation of this model is its failure to detect a threat that is 
not programmed as a rule in the system [41]. RIPPER (repeated incremental 
pruning to produce error reduction) is an example of rule based model that 
builds a set of rules to detect normal behaviour and abnormal behaviour. 
R.Naidu et al[42]  used KDDCup ’99 dataset to compare the performance of 
RIPPER rule, decision tree(C5) and support vector machine(SVM). The 
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dataset was categorised into 3 (NORMAL, probe attacks and DoS attacks). 
The RIPPER rule algorithm went through two stages during the experiment. 
The first stage initialised the rule conditions and the second stage the rule 
optimisation. The algorithm obtained conditions in each rule to classify the 
testing data. The RIPPER rule recorded a total detection rate of 98.69%, C5 
98.75% and SVM 98.63%. 
 Statistics model collects data in a profile. Analysing the profile of normal 
statistical behaviour gives a description shown by the patterns from data to 
help make conclusions if an activity is normal or abnormal. The system then 
develops a distance vector for the observed traffic and the profile. An alarm is 
raised by the system when the distance is great enough [15],[14], [36], [43]. 
These models are sub categorised into four: mean/standard deviation, 
multivariate, Markov process and operational model. Dorothy Denning [44] 
discusses model based on the hypothesis that security violation can be 
detected by monitoring a system’s audit records for changes in pattern. The 
model includes profiles for representing the behaviour of subjects with respect 
to objects in terms of metrics and statistical models and rules for acquiring 
knowledge about this behaviour from audit records and detecting anomalous 
behaviour. 
a) Mean, standard deviation and any other form of correlations are known as 
moments in statistics  [35], [45]. A moment is said to be anomalous when 
events fall either above or below a set interval. Decisions are made taking 
system change into account by altering statistical rule set for the system 
[35]. Its advantage over the operational model is its ability to detect attacks 
without having prior knowledge of the normal activities to set its limits. 
Rather it learns form observations to determine its normal activities [35]. It 
is a complex model that has more flexibility than the threshold model. It 
does not require prior knowledge to determine the normal behaviour to 
help set pre-defined threshold. Varying the mean and standard deviations 
slightly changes the computation by putting extra weights on the more 
recent values [35]. A.Ashfag et al[46] proposed a standard deviation 
normalised entropy of accuracy hybrid method of intrusion detection. Two 
real traffic dataset were used. The endpoint dataset comprising 14months 
of traffic traces on a diverse set of 13 endpoints. The dataset was reduced 
to 6weeks of traffic for testing and training purposes. The endpoints were 
infected with different malware attacks. The second was attack data 
dataset was obtained from two international network locations at Lawrence 
Berkeley National laboratory, USA on three distinct days. Using 9 
prominent classifiers on the two datasets showed 3%-10% increase in 
detection rate and 40% decrease in false alarm rate over the existing 
classifiers can be achieved with the proposed hybrid technique. 
b) Multivariate models are similar to the mean and standard deviation model 
[35], [47]. The multivariate models are based on correlations between two 
or more metrics. They use multiple variables to predict possible outcomes. 
For example the number of CPU cycles can be compared to how long a 
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login session is completed [47]. Theoretically this model could have a fine 
distinction   over one variable [47]. In an approach by W.Sha et al.[48], 
multivariate time series and high-order Markov chain were taken into 
account along the detailed design of training and testing algorithms. The 
models were evaluated using DARPA dataset. Observing the multi order 
Markov chain showed that the relative positions between results from 
models of different orders provide a new effective indication for 
anomalies. To improve sensitivity, a combining multiple sequences as a 
multivariate one into a simple model was applied and proved that the 
return of values of the system calls also play an important role in detection.  
c) Markov process has two approaches: Markov chains and hidden Markov 
models. The Markov model is a set of finite states interconnected going 
through a stochastic process to determine the topology and capabilities of a 
model [36]. Each stage in the process depends on the outcome of the 
previous stage. The anomalies are detected [35] by comparison of the 
associated probability recorded for the process with a fixed threshold. This 
gives it an advantage of detecting unusual multiple occurrence of events 
[47]. The hidden Markov model assumes the system to be a Markov 
process where stochastic processes with finite states of possible outcomes 
are hidden [36]. Ye Nong [49] presented an anomaly technique using 
Markov chain model to detect intrusion. In this model, Markov chain was 
used to represent a temporal profile of normal behaviour in a computer and 
network system. The Markov chain model of the normal profile is learned 
from the historic data of the system’s normal behaviour. The observed 
behaviour of the system is analysed to see if the Markov chain model of 
the normal behaviour supports the observed behaviour. A low probability 
of support indicates an anomalous behaviour meaning an intrusion. The 
technique was implemented on the Sun Solaris system and distinguished 
normal activities from attacks perfectly.  
2.1.3 Signature Based Detection 
Signature based detection defines a set of rules used to match the patterns in the network 
traffic. If a mismatch is detected it raises an alarm [50]. It has an advantage of being able to 
detect attacks giving a low false positive detection ratio [51] It has a drawback of being able 
to detect only attacks known to the database [19]. Signature based detection systems are 
programmed with distinct decision rules. The rules set for detection are coded in a straight 
forward manner to detect intrusion. They are programmed in four categories: state modelling, 
expert system, and string matching. 
 State modelling is the encoding of attacks as a number of different states in a finite 
automaton. Each of these attacks has to be observed in the traffic profile to be 
considered as an intrusion. They occur in sub-classes as time series models [15]: the 
first is state transition which was proposed by Porras et al. which uses a state 
transition diagram to represent intrusion [52]. The approach in [52]models intrusion 
as a series of state transitions which are described as signature action and states 
descriptions. State diagrams were written to correspond to the states of an actual 
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computer system. The basis of a rule based expert system to detect intrusions was 
formed by these diagrams. The intrusions are in the form of a simple chain 
transitioning from start to end. The second is the petri-net where states form a petri-
net. They form a tree structure where the transition states are not in any order 
[15][53]. 
 Expert systems contain a set of rules used to describe attacks scenarios known to the 
system. The given rules that describe the attack scenarios are often forward-chaining 
systems. A production based expert system tool has been used since they best handle 
systems with new events entering into the system. The size of the rule based increases 
as the execution speed increases since the rule will go through a longer list. It is 
however vulnerable to attacks not known to the set rules [2]. P.Zhisong et al.[54], 
presented an intrusion detection system model based on neural network and expert 
system. The aim of the experiment was to take advantage of classification abilities of 
neural network for probe and Dos attacks and expert based for U2R and R2L attacks. 
KDD Cup’99 dataset was employed in the experiment. Expert system was able to 
improve the detection accuracy using the detection rules: ALERT UDP ENET any <-
> HNET 31337 MESSAGE:"BO access" DATA: |ce63 d1d2 16e7 13cf 3ca5 a586|". 
 String matching is a process of knowledge acquisition just as Expert system but has a 
different approach in exploiting the knowledge [14]. It deals with matching the 
patterns in the audit event generated by the attack but not involved in the decision 
making process [47]. This technique has been used effectively commercially as an 
IDS [55], [56]. It is noted that not all signature based IDS can be represented by a 
simple pattern which gives it a limitation [57]. T.Sheu et al.[58]proposed an efficient 
string matching algorithm with compact memory as well as high worst-case 
performance. A magic number heuristic based on the Chinese remainder theorem was 
adopted. The algorithm significantly reduced the memory requirements without 
bringing complex processes. The latency of off-chip memory references was 
drastically reduced. It was concluded the algorithm gives a cost effective and an 
efficient IDS.  
2.1.4 Discussion 
A summary table of intrusion techniques, source of data, applications and data used in 
selected reviewed papers between 2014 and 2016 is shown in Table II.  
Table II. Summary table of selected reviewed papers. 
Authors/Year Year 
Published 
Intrusion 
Technique 
Source of 
Data 
Application Data Set 
Chetna and Harsh 
[59]  
2014 Anomaly NIDS Cloud computing Real Life 
M. Ali Alheeti et al. 
[60] 
2016 Anomaly NIDS Transport Real Life 
J. Hong et al. 
[61] 
2014 Anomaly NIDS Substation Real Life 
R. Mohan et al. [62] 2015 Signature HIDS/NIDS Cloud computing Real Life 
S. Vasudeo et al. 
[63] 
2015 Anomaly/ 
Signature 
HIDS/NIDS Computer systems Real Life 
W.Haider et al. [64] 2015 Anomaly HIDS Cloud computing ADFA-LD 
and 
KDD98 
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H. Toumi et al. [65] 2015 Signature  NIDS Cloud computing Real Life 
M. Guerroumi et al. 
[66] 
2015 Signature HIDS Internet of things 
(IoT) 
Real Life 
N. Dipika et al. [67]  2015 Anomaly NIDS Information 
systems 
KDD99 
Cup 
W.Haider et al. [68] 2015 Anomaly HIDS Cyber space KDD98 
and UNM 
N.Aissa et al. [69] 2015 Anomaly NIDS Computer systems KDD99 
H. Omessaad [70] 2015 Signature HIDS Cloud computing  Real Life 
X. Lin et al. [71] 2015 Signature NIDS Transport  Real Life 
S. Banerjee et al. 
[72] 
2015 Signature/ 
Anomaly 
NIDS Computer systems Real Life 
P. Satam [73] 2015 Anomaly NIDS Telecommunication Real Life 
 
Recent works have shown that works are still on-going using the Intrusion technique and 
source of data techniques. S.Vasudeo et al. [63] presented a hybrid of Signature and Anomaly 
with a hybrid of data source on a real life dataset. S.Banerjee et al.[72]also combined 
signature and anomaly technique on real life dataset. Other referenced works the table applied 
single techniques on real life datasets and KDD Cup datasets. The application of these 
techniques cut across all areas to determine their effectiveness in detecting intrusion.  
3.0 MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES 
Anomaly detection systems are human-independent. They detect anomalies by revealing 
abnormal characteristics in a system over a period of time [44]. The effectiveness of this 
technique is its capabilities to differentiate between normal and abnormalities within a 
network. 
Machine Learning (ML) can provide IDS methods to detect current, new and subtle attacks 
without extensive human-based training or intervention. It is defined as a set of methods that 
can automatically detect patterns to predict future data trends [74],[75].   Whilst a large 
number of machine learning techniques exist, the fundamental operation of all of them relies 
upon optimal feature selection.  These features of are the metrics which will be used to detect 
patterns and trends.  For example, one feature of a network is the packet size: machine 
learning techniques may monitor the packet size over time and generate distributions from 
which conclusions may be drawn regarding an intrusion.  This section reviews the feature 
selection of machine learning IDS and classification of machine learning techniques used as 
IDS in Figure 3. 
3.1 IDS feature selection 
Machine learning classification involves two phases: the classification phase and training 
phase. The training phase learns the distribution of the features and during the classification 
phase the learned features is applied as a normal profile where any abnormality will be 
detected [76], [77]. A.K. Jain et al. [78] developed a model of statistical pattern recognition 
as shown in Fig.3. The test and training data are normalised in the processing unit as well as 
removing noise form the data. In the training phase, the feature extraction unit extracts a 
representation feature set from the processed training data which are used in training a 
classifier. In the classification phase, the trained classifier is applied to assign the test data to 
the selected features from the training phase [77]. 
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Figure 3 Model of Machine learning classification process 
A high quality of training data is required to achieve the best performance of ML IDS. The 
training data thus contain both normal and abnormal patterns [76]. Features are the important 
information extracted form from raw data and are important in classification and detection 
which influence the effectiveness of ML IDS. In [79], C. Kruegel et al. created attacks 
containing system call sequences similar to normal system call. Kruegel et al. addressed the 
issue by analysing on the system call arguments instead of finding the relations between 
sequences of actions [76]. Table III. Shows the features extracted by Kruegel et al. for four 
different arguments. 
Table III. Extracted features by Kruegel et al. [76] for four different arguments 
No. Feature Description 
1 String length 
2 String character 
3 Structural inference 
4 Token finder 
 
In [80], V. Mahoney et al. extracted features by analysing each header-field of network 
packets and flows. The proposed approach det6ected anomalies in a network based on 33 
fields of IP, UDP, TCP, ICMP and Ethernet protocols. Table IV shows some of the extracted 
features. 
Table IV. Extracted features based on analysis of each header field  
No. Feature Description No. Feature Description 
1 IP Source 
 
10 IP protocol 
 
2 IP Destination 
 
11 IP Length 
 
3 TCP Source Port 
 
12 IP Type of Service 
 
4 TCP Destination Port 
 
13 IP Header Length 
 
5 UDP Source Port 
 
14 IP Time to Live 
 
6 UDP Destination Port 
 
15 Ether Source 
 
7 UDP Length 
 
16 Ethernet Size 
 
11 
 
8 ICMP Code 17 Ethernet Destination 
 
9 ICMP Type 18 Ethernet Protocol 
 
In [81], W. Lee et al. extracted features from TCP/IP connections. Experiment was conducted 
on 1998 DARPA dataset where a set of basic features from domain knowledge was extracted. 
Most of the basic features could only be extracted after the TCP connection was terminated 
leading to a delay in the detection phase [76]. The 1998 DARPA dataset is categorised into 
five. These are NORMAL and four different types of attack. The attacks are: Dos attacks, 
probe attack, User to root (U2R) attack and Remote to local (R2L) attacks. Dos attack which 
denies or prevents legitimate users resource on a network or system by introducing useless or 
unwanted traffic. Probe is an attack which scans through a computer network to make a 
profile of information for future attacks. U2R is attacks use a local account from a remote 
machine to gain access to the targets system due to vulnerabilities in its operating system. 
R2L attacks are initiated to gain unauthorised access to root privileges from outside.   Table 
V. illustrates the basic features of individual TCP connections by W. Lee et al. 
Table V. Basic features extracted from individual TCP connections  
No. Feature Name Feature Description Type 
1 Duration 
 
Length of connection in seconds 
 
continuous 
 
2 protocol_type 
 
Type of the protocol used, e.g.. up,tcp, etc. 
 
discrete 
 
3 Service 
 
Network service on the destination, e.g.http, 
telnet, etc. 
 
discrete 
 
4 scr_bytes 
 
Number of data bytes from source to destination 
 
continuous 
 
5 dst_bytes 
 
Number of data bytes form destination to source 
 
continuous 
 
6 Flag 
 
Normal or error status of network 
 
discrete 
 
7 Land 
 
1 if connection is from/to same host/port; 0 
otherwise 
 
discrete 
 
8 wrong_fragment 
 
Number of wrong fragments 
 
continuous 
 
9 Urgent Number of wrong fragments 
 
continuous 
 
 
Table VI. Traffic features extracted from a 2second time window 
No. Feature Name Feature Description Type 
10 Count 
 
Number of connections to the same host as the 
current connection in the past 2seconds 
 
continuous 
 
11 serror_rate 
 
Percentage of connections having “SYN” error 
 
continuous 
 
12 rerror_rate 
 
Percentage of connections having “REJ” error 
 
continuous 
 
13 same_srv_rate 
 
Percentage of connections having same service 
 
continuous 
 
14 diff_srv_rate 
 
Percentage of connections having different service 
 
continuous 
 
12 
 
15 srv_count 
 
Number of connections to the same service as the 
current 1connection in the past 2seconds 
 
continuous 
 
16 srv_serror_rate Percentage of connections having “SYN” errors 
 
continuous 
 
17 srv_rerror_rate 
 
Percentage of connections having “REJ” errors 
 
continuous 
 
18  srv_diff_host_rate Percentage of connections to different host  
 
Table VII. Traffic features extracted from a window of 100 connections 
No Feature Name Feature Description Type 
19 dst_host_count Count for destination host continuous 
 
20 
 
dst_host_serror_rate 
Percentage of connections having “SYN” errors continuous 
 
 
21 
 
dst_host_rerror_rate 
Percentage of connections having “REJ” errors continuous 
 
 
22 
 
dst_host_same_srv_rate 
Percentage of connections having same service continuous 
 
 
23 
 
dst_host_diff_srv_rate 
Percentage of connections having different 
service 
continuous 
 
 
24 
 
 
dst_host_srv_count 
 
 
Number of connections to the same destination 
port 
 
continuous 
 
 
25 
 
 
dst_host_srv_serror_rate 
 
 
Percentage of connections having “SYN” errors 
 
continuous 
 
 
26 
 
 
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate 
 
 
Percentage of connections having “REJ” errors 
 
continuous 
 
 
27 
 
 
dst_host_srv_diff_host _rate 
 
Percentage of connections to different host 
 
continuous 
 
 
28 
 
dst_host_same_src_port _rate 
 
Percentage of connections to the same source port 
 
continuous 
 
Table VIII. Traffic features extracted within a connection suggested by domain knowledge 
No. Feature Name Feature Description Type 
29 Hot Number of “hot” indicators continuous 
 
30 
 
 
num_failed_logins 
 
 
Number of failed login attempts 
 
 
continuous 
 
31 
 
logged_in 
 
1 if successfully login; 0 otherwise 
 
discrete 
 
32 
 
num_compromised 
 
Number of “compromised” conditions 
 
continuous 
 
33 
 
root_shell 
 
1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise 
 
discrete 
 
34 
 
su_attempted 
 
1 if “su root” command attempted; 0 otherwise 
 
discrete 
 
35 
 
num_root 
 
Number of “root” accesses 
 
continuous 
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36 
 
num_file_creations 
 
Number of file creation operations continuous 
 
37 num_shells Number of shell prompts continuous 
 
38 
 
num_access_files 
 
Number of operations in access control files 
 
continuous 
 
 
39 
 
 
num_outbound_cmd 
 
 
Number of outbound commands in an ftp session 
 
 
continuous 
40 is_hot_login 
 
1 if the login belongs to the “hot” list; 0 otherwise 
 
discrete 
41 is_guest_login 1 if the login is a “guest” login; 0 otherwise discrete 
 
W. Lee et al. discovered many attacks such as R2L and U2R were in the payloads of packets. 
This prompted a proposal to combine features extracted from the payload with domain 
knowledge. They called the features “time based traffic” features for connection records. 
Features 10 to 18 in table VI are extracted using a 2second time window with 11 to 15 having 
same host connection and 16 to 18 having same service connection, 19 to 28 in Table VII are 
extracted from a window of 100 connections with 20 to 24 same host connection and 25 to 28 
same service connection. 29 to 41 in Table VIII are features extracted from connections 
suggested by domain knowledge [77]. Both tables provide a detailed insight mapping the 
most current and meaningful features for machine learning intrusion detection systems.  
3.2 Classification of Machine Learning Techniques 
This section gives an extensive classification of ML techniques. Each of the techniques is 
described in detail and how these techniques have been applied as IDS. Figure 3.1 shows the 
classification of Machine learning IDS. 
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Figure 3.1 ML based techniques 
 Bayesian Networks are graphical modelling tools used to model the probability of 
variables of interest. They are directed acrylic graphs where each node represents a 
discrete random variable of interest. Each node contains the states of the random 
variable in tabular form representing the conditional probability table (CPT) which 
specifies conditional probabilities of the domain variable with other connected 
variables. The CPT of each node contains probabilities of the node being in a specific 
state given the domain variable states. The existence of the relationship between the 
nodes of the domain variable and connected variables in a Bayesian networks show 
the direction of causality between other connected variables. Thus the connected 
variables are causally dependent on the ones represented by the domain variable. 
Given a set of discrete random variable 𝑋 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑛}, the joint probability of the 
variable can be computed based on Bayes Rule as: 
 
𝑃(𝑥1, 𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑛) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑥𝑖\𝑝𝑎(𝑥𝑖))
𝑛
𝑡=1                                                                           (1) 
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where  𝑝𝑎(𝑥𝑖) represents the specific values of the variables in the domain variable 
node of 𝑥𝑡 [82], [83]. This technique has generally been used as an intrusion detection 
system. 
A. Onik  et al.[84] Conducted an experiment using Bayesian networks on NSL-KDD 
dataset containing 25,192 records with 41 features. Apart from the normal class label 
it contained 4 more class of attacks known as Dos, U2R, R2L and probe attacks. The 
filter approach of feature selection was used to reduce the dataset features from 41 to 
16 important features. Bayesian model was built and proved to predict attacks with 
superior overall performance accuracy rate of 97.27% keeping the false positive rate 
at a lower rate of 0.008. The model as compared to Naïve Bayes, K-means clustering, 
decision stamp and RBF network recorded 84.86%, 80.75%, 83.31% and 91.03% 
respectively in terms of accuracy. 
An experiment by M. Bode et al.[85] Analysed the network traffic in a cyber situation 
with Bayesian network classifier on the KDD Cup’99 dataset with 490,021 records. 
The data set was made up of 4 types of attacks (DoS, U2R, R2L and probe). In this 
experiment, they adopted the risk matrix to analyse the risk zone of the attacks. The 
risk analysis adopted showed DoS was most frequent attack in occurrences. The 
results showed Bayesian network classifier is a suitable model resulting in same 
performance level classifying the DoS attacks as association rule mining. Bayesian 
network classifier outperformed Genetic Algorithm in classifying probe and U2R 
attacks and classified Dos equally.    
 Genetic Algorithm (GA) is an adaptive search method in a class of evolutional 
computation using techniques inspired from convolutional biological process. The 
principle is based on a stochastic global [25] search method initialising with a random 
generation of  chromosomes. The chromosomes are called population. They evolve 
through selection, crossover and mutation as shown in Figure 3.2. Each chromosome 
represents a problem to be solved and encoded as strings. The positions of the 
chromosomes are commonly represented as binary (0, 1) or as a list of integers. These 
positions sometimes referred to as genes keep changing at each initialisation. The 
solution created during each generation is based on an evaluation function. The 
selection is thus based on the chromosome fitness level [86], [87]. 
 
Figure 3.2 Flow chart of Genetic Algorithm 
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 Tao Xia et al. [88] developed a hybrid method based information theory and GA. 
Information theory was used to filter out the most important features out of 41 
features in KDD’99 dataset with 494021 records. Linear rule was used initially to 
classify normal and abnormal before GA to obtain the appropriate classification. In 
the detection of Dos, U2R, R2L and probe attacks, the information theory and GA 
hybrid method recorded 99.33%, 63.64%, 5.86% and 93.95% as detection rates 
respectively. The detection rates were compared to Ctree and C5. Ctree recorded 
98.91%, 88.13%, 7.41% and 50.35% whilst C5 recorded 97.1%, 13.2%, 8.4% and 
83.3% respectively for the attacks.  
In layered approach for intrusion detection systems based GA, M. Padmadas et al.[89]  
Proposed a method to overcome the weakness in a single layer intrusion detection 
system. The layered approach is based on GA with the four layers corresponding to 
four groups of attacks (probe, DoS, U2R and R2L). Each layer is trained separately 
with a number of features where the layer acts as a filter to block any malicious 
activity. In layered approach there is no mathematical approach to calculate the filter 
parameters for the attacks. This paper presented GA approach in calculating the filter 
parameters making the system more secure. The model efficiently detected R2L attack 
and recorded an accuracy of 90% in detection. 
 Support Vector Machines (SVM) is a machine learning algorithm that learns to 
classify data using points labelled training examples falling into one or two classes. 
The SVM algorithm builds a model that can predict if a new example falls into one 
category or the other [90],[25], [91] . Figure 3.3 shows a hyperplane defined by 
(𝑤, 𝑏), where 𝑤 is a weight and 𝑏 bias constructed in a finite space of the training 
sample 𝑁 with points: 
{(𝑥1, 𝑦1)(𝑥2, 𝑦2 … (𝑥𝑁, 𝑦𝑁))}                                                                                      (2) 
Where 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑖 ∈ {1, −1}.  This is conducted since in general the larger the 
margin, the lower the generalisation error of the classifier [92]. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Maximum-margin hyper plane and margins for an SVM trained with 
samples from two classes. 
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B. Senthilnayaki et al.[93] Used GA pre-processed KDD Cup 99 dataset in a pre-
processing module for data reduction since it was complex to process the dataset with 
all 41 features. GA was used to select 10 features out of 41 features present in the 
KDD Cup 99 dataset and applied SVM for classification. The experiment was carried 
out with 100,000 records from the dataset out of which 95% was used as training data 
and remaining 10% as test data. The classification process continued till a 10 fold 
cross validation was done for results verification. The SVM classified four different 
attacks (DoS, probe, U2R, R2L attacks). The performance of SVM classifier was 
compared with four other classifiers as shown in table IX.              
           Table IX. SVM performance analysis SVM, GMM, Naive, MLP and linear algorithm 
Classified  Algorithm Accuracy%  
(41 feature) 
Accuracy%  
(10 features) 
Gmm 30.5 45.07 
Naive 45.17 55.75 
MLP 55.24 67.87 
Linear 65.47 76.75 
SVM 82.45 95.26 
 
Another experiment by L.Teng et al. [94]proposed a novel method integrating PCA 
and SVM by optimising the kernel parameters using automatic parameter selection 
technique. The experiment was performed on KDD Cup’99 dataset containing five 
categories of traffic (normal, DoS attack, R2L attack, U2R attack and probe attack). 
Each network record had 41 features of which 7 were discrete and 34 continuous 
features. C parameter for RBF kernel of SVM was optimised by the proposed 
automatic parameter reduction along with cross validation to reduce the training and 
testing time to give better accuracy in detecting attacks. 
 K-Nearest Neighbour (K-NN) is a fundamental technique for sample classification. 
This technique is known to be non-parametric and highly efficient in classification 
[95]. It evaluates the class labels of the test samples [96] based on the majority of test 
sample neighbours. The parameter 𝑘 is determined by the user. Based on the test 
sample, 𝑘 numbers of training points are determined by taking the closest distance to 
the test sample. The prediction of the test sample is the 𝑘 nearest neighbours [97]. 
A hybrid method of intrusion detection system by Y.Canbay et al.[96]proposed 
combination of K-NN and GA algorithm. They tested the hybrid algorithm on KDD 
Cup 99 dataset labelled out of five classes; normal, probe attack, Dos attack, R2L 
attack and U2R attack. The dataset was reduced to 1000,2000,3000,4000 and 5000 
records respectively with 19 features. GA was used to select the 𝑘 nearest neighbour 
for K-NN classifier. Three experiments were performed to conclude on the hybrid 
method. Each experiment used 10 fold cross validation with different 𝑘 values. The 
values in in terms of accuracy were compared with the conventional K-NN. The 
proposed hybrid method proved better than conventional K-NN in all values of 𝑘 used 
in the experiment. 
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On the same dataset Q.Zeng et al. [98]compared the performance of K-NN and SVM 
model  and RIPPER method in detecting attacks. The multi attribute decision was 
adopted in this experiment. In the classification of an unknown document vector 𝑋, 
𝑘–nearest neighbour algorithm ranks the document’s neighbour among the training 
document vectors and uses the class labels of the 𝑘 most similar neighbours to predict 
the class of the new document. The similarity in each neighbour to 𝑋 is used to 
determine the classes of the neighbour where the similarity is measured by the 
Euclidean distance between two document vectors. With this adoption they 
categorised each new program behaviour in the dataset into either normal or attack 
class. Each system call was treated as a word and each process as a document. 𝑘 was 
varied between 15 and 35 till an optimal value of 19 found. The classification was 
performed with K-NN and SVM model. The Hit rate was compared to the RIPPER 
method. The results showed 97.26% accuracy rate and 6.03% false alarm rate for K-
NN and SVM model whilst the RIPPER method gave 87.26% accuracy rate and 8.6% 
false positive rate. 
 Decision Tree (DT) algorithm learns and models a data set in classification problems. 
It classifies new data set according to what it has learnt from previous data set [99]. It 
uses a well-defined criterion in the selection of best features of each node tree during 
their construction. A decision tree model has a root node linking to different nodes as 
attribute data deciding the path for each node [100]. Decisions are made by 
comparison of previous data and marked as leaves [101]. A common decision tree 
approach is the C4.5 algorithm.  
In network intrusion detection system using decision tree (J48) by S.Sahu et al. [102] 
a labelled data set called Kyoto 2006+ was used. The data consist of 24 features, 14 of 
which was extracted form KDD Cup 99 dataset and an additional ten important 
features. The Perl language was used to extract 15 features from the dataset for the 
experiment. The sample dataset contained 134665 records; 44257 normal, 86649 
known attacks and 3759 unknown attacks. Decision tree (J48) built using WEKA 
3.6.10 tool was used to classify normal, known attacks and unknown attacks in the 
network packets. The results showed the decision tree generated classified 97.23% 
correctly and 2.67% incorrectly. The simulation results showed decision tree can 
classify unknown attacks as well. 
T.Komviriyavut  et al.[101]presented two intrusion detection techniques which were 
decision tree (C4.5) and RIPPER rules to test an online dataset (RLD09 dataset). 
RLD09 dataset was collected from actual environment and refined to have 13 
features. The dataset is categorised into three; normal, DoS attack and Probe attack. 
The experimental data set had 3,000 records of three types of unknown probe attacks 
each with 1,000 attack records. Initial experiment with known attacks on dataset 
showed a total detection rate of about 98% for both decision tree and RIPPER rule. 
A second experiment on the same data set with three unknown probe attacks (advance 
port scan, Xmas tree and ACK scan) was performed. The decision tree maintained its 
detection rate of 98% whilst the RIPPER rule degraded to about 50%in average.  
 Fuzzy logic (FL) concept is derived [103] from the fuzzy sets theory which deals 
with approximately reasoning with uncertainty and imprecision [104] by human 
being. The features this technique which handles real life uncertainty makes it 
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attractive for anomaly detection. Intrusion detection involves the classification of a 
normal class and an abnormal class. The well-defined nature of the two classes makes 
this computation paradigm a helpful one. 
A.Toosi et al.[105]introduced a new approach using different soft computing 
techniques into classification system to classify abnormal behaviour form normal 
depending on the attack type. This work investigated neuro-fuzzy networks, fuzzy 
inference and GA on KDD Cup 99 10% dataset. The dataset had a distribution of 
normal and four different attacks (probe, DoS, R2L and U2R). A set of parallel neuro-
fuzzy classifiers were used initially for classification. The fuzzy inference system was 
based on the output of the neuro-fuzzy classifier determining normal or abnormal 
activity. The best results were attained by optimising the structure of the fuzzy 
decision tree with GA. 
   
 Clustering is the division of data with no apparent distinguished differences into 
groups by functions of two or more parameters. Each group is called a cluster and 
have no similarity. The greater the dissimilarity the better the grouping. Their class 
labels are always unknown. K-means is an example of clustering algorithm used as 
IDS [106],[107]. K-means algorithm makes use of the Euclidean distance to calculate 
the data and the cluster centre. The aim is to have a minimum distance within a cluster 
and achieve a maximum distance between clusters by the minimisation of an objective 
function [108].  
 Li Jun Tao et al.[109]proposed a k-means clustering with dynamic adjustable number 
of cluster. They introduced an algorithm that uses an improved Euclidean distance 
formula to calculate the distance between the data and cluster centre by automatically 
adjusting the number of cluster when the distance is more than the threshold. This 
experiment was performed on KDD Cup’99 dataset containing four attacks (DoS, 
Probe, R2L and U2R). The total number of dataset records was 72471. The improved 
k-means algorithm recorded 77 clusters with a detection rate of 90% and false 
positive rate of 15%. The results compared to the traditional k-means were 108 
clusters, detection rate of 85% and false positive rate of 42%. 
3.3 Analytical Comparison of ML Techniques  
The various ML techniques discussed in the above section are different in their capabilities to 
classify attacks. Table X. analyses the advantages and disadvantages in the performance of 
ML techniques. 
Table X. Advantages and disadvantages of ML techniques 
ML Technique Advantages Disadvantages 
Bayesian Network The graphical representation gives it 
an advantage of breaking complex 
problems into different smaller 
models.  
 Slow in classifying data sets with many 
features. 
Genetic Algorithm -Uses a technique which is inspired 
by convolutional biological process. 
-It has the capability of solving 
optimisation problems during 
classification. 
 Gets stack in local optima  
(overfitting) 
Support  -The algorithm is simple to analyse -Selection of kernel function is not straight 
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Vector Machine mathematically. 
-All computations are performed in 
space using kernels giving it an edge 
to be used practically. 
forward. 
-Slow in training and requires more memory 
space. 
K-Nearest Neighbour Easy to implement and can solve 
multi-class problems 
-Slow in training and requires large memory 
space. 
-It is computationally complex because to 
classify a test sample involve the 
consideration of all training samples.  
Decision tree -It has a unique structure therefore 
easy to interpret. 
-It has no limitation in handling high 
dimensional data sets. 
-If trees are not pruned back it causes 
overfitting. 
-Type of data must be considered when 
constructing tree. 
(i.e. Categorical or numerical) 
Fuzzy Logic -It is based on human reasoning 
concepts which are not precise. 
-It gives a representation of 
uncertainty. 
-It’s construction has a high level of 
generality there by high consumption of 
resource. 
K-means Algorithm Simple to implement and effective -The outcome of clustering depends on how 
cluster centres are initialised to specify k 
value. 
-The algorithm works for only numerical 
data. 
 
3.4 ML Hybrid Techniques 
ML Intrusion detection systems have generally been used to detect attacks but in recent 
times, using two or more different techniques to form a hybrid has improved the overall 
performance. Table XI. Shows accuracy of detection, type of attacks and data set for selected 
reviewed ML IDS papers from 2011-2016. 
Table XI. ML  IDS accuracy of detection and Data set used  
Authors(s)/Year ML Technique Attack Type(s) Data Set Accuracy 
S.Chordia et al. 
[107] 2015 
K-means +KNN+DT R2L,U2R,DoS and 
probe 
KDDCup99 96.55% 
P. Jongsuebsuk et 
al.            [110]  
2013 
FL+GA Dos and Probe Real Life  97% 
B.Senthilnayaki et 
al.            [93] 
2015  
GA+SVM Dos 
Probe 
U2R 
R2L 
KDDCup99 99.15% 
99.08% 
97.03% 
96.50% 
B. Masduki  
et al.              [7] 
2015 
SVM 
 
 
R2L KDDCup99 96.08% 
A.Enache et al.    
[111] 
2015 
SVM+BAT 
Algorithm 
Malicious NL-KDD 99.38% 
S. Akbar et al. 
                    [112] 
2012 
GA DoS,R2L,U2R and 
Probe 
KDDCup99 92.6% 
A. Aziz et al. 
                    [113] 
2013 
DT Dos 
Probe 
NSL-KDD 82% 
64% 
Chao Lin et al. 
                    [114] 
2015 
Cluster centre+ K-
NN 
Probe 
Dos 
 
 
KDDCup99 
(6 dimensional data 
set) 
99.98% 
99.99% 
 
A.Aburomman et SVM+K-NN DoS,R2L,U2R and KDDCup99 87.44-91.69% 
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al. [115]    
 2016                   
Probe 
Shi-Jin Horng et 
al.                [116] 
2011 
SVM + hierarchical 
clustering algorithm 
DoS,R2L,U2R and 
Probe 
KDDCup99 95.72% 
E. Hodo et 
al.[117] 2016 
ANN DDoS/Dos Real Life 99.4% 
 
As demonstrated in Table XI, the majority of Intrusion Detection Systems using machine 
learning have tested their work against the KDDCup99 dataset or the NSL-KDD, in contrast 
only two recent studies tested their machine learning systems against real network data.  
3.5 Binary Classification metrics 
The effectiveness of prediction by the ML algorithm which is either 1 or 0 is based on 
confusion matrix prediction outcome as shown Table IX. The outcomes are True Negative 
(TN), True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) [118], [119]. 
                                                                               Table IX. Confusion Matrix 
Predicted Class 
Negative 
Class(Normal) 
Positive 
Class(Attack) 
 
Actual Class 
 
Negative Class(Normal) True 
Negative(TN) 
False 
Positive(FP) 
Positive Class(Attack) False 
Negative(FN) 
True 
Positive(TP) 
 
 True Negative (TN): a measure of the number of normal events rightly classified 
normal. 
 True Positive (TP): a measure of attacks classified rightly as attack. 
 False Positive (FP): a measure of normal events misclassified as attacks. 
 False Negative (FN): a measure of attacks misclassified as normal. 
The following are the basic metrics used to calculate the performance of ML IDS: 
True negative rate (Specifity) =
𝑇𝑃
𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁
                                                                                   (3)      
True positive rate (Sensitivity) =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
                                                                                  (4)      
False positive rate (Fallout) =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
= 1 − 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑦                                                         (5)      
False negative rate (Miss Rate) =  
𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁+𝑇𝑃
= 1 − 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦                                                (6)   
Precision =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
                                                                                                                   (7) 
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Recall =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
                                                                                                                       (8) 
Overall accuracy=  
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁+𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁+𝐹𝑃
                                                                                            (9) 
A commonly used ML IDS metric is detection rate. This is defined as the number of data 
examples correctly classified divided by the test examples. 
4.0 ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK AND DEEP NETWORKS IDS 
This section reviews artificial neural network (ANN) and Deep learning which use the 
computational intelligence approach to detect attacks. 
4.1 Artificial Neural Network 
 
Figure 4 Classification of Artificial Neural Network 
Artificial neural network consist of information processing elements known to mimic neurons 
of the brain. ANN is categorised into supervised and unsupervised learning. Figure 4 shows 
the types of ANN. 
4.1.1 Supervised Learning  
In supervised learning, the neural network is provided with a labelled training set which 
learns a mapping from inputs 𝑥 to outputs 𝑦 given a labelled set of inputs-output pairs 
                  𝑑 = {(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖)}𝑖=1
𝑁                                                                                                   (10)     
Where 𝑑 is called the training set and 𝑁 is the number of training examples. It is assumed that 
𝑦𝑖 is a categorical variable from some infinite set 𝑦𝑖 ∈ {1 … 𝐶} [120]. Two types of 
supervised learning algorithms are used to train a neural network for intrusion detection. 
 Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) is a feedforward neural network. The structure of MLP 
consists of one or more nodes as the inner layer between the input and output nodes as 
shown in Figure 4.1. The most common technique used to train the MLP neural 
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network is the Back Propagation hence the name MLP-BP. The construction of the 
MLP-BP neural network is by putting layers of non-linear elements to form complex 
hypotheses. The more stages that are added (nodes) the more advance the hypotheses. 
Each node takes an element of a feature vector. The output nodes give an output of 
two classes (normal and attack). The interconnection between the nodes is associated 
with scalar weights with an initial weight assigned to the connection. During training, 
the weights are adjusted. Evaluating the hypotheses is done by setting the input modes 
in a feed-back process and the values are propagated through the network to the 
output. At this stage the gradient descents is used so as to push the error in the output 
node back through the network by a back propagation process in order to estimate the 
error in the hidden nodes. The gradient of the cost – function can thus be calculated 
[99], [121]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Three layer neural network 
 
In [122], P. Barapatre et al.[122]experimented with neural network having an input 
layer, one hidden layer and one output layer. In this experiment, the input node had 41 
features from KDD Cup’99 dataset. The output node was to classify normal or attack 
present in dataset. If the output node is ‘0’ then it is labelled “normal” and if ‘1’ it is 
labelled “attack”. The learning rate was initially set to 0.1 and the system retrained to 
reduce learning rate. A sigmoid activation function was used and values 
corresponding to the weights randomly initialised between -1 and -. The system was 
trained for each category of attacks (DoS, Probe, U2R and R2L attacks) to determine 
the performance of the algorithm on individual attacks. Table IIX shows the 
experimental results. It was concluded MLP-BP neural network detected DoS and 
Probe attacks more accurately than U2R attacks. It observed an increase in rate of 
classification as rate of learning decreases giving rise to a slow convergence. Also 
reducing the rate of learning and the sum squared error (SSE) values and re-training 
the network showed an improvement in rate of detection.  
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Table IIX Detection rate comparison for different attack types using MLP 
Attack type Detection 
rate % 
False positive rate 
% 
False negative rate 
% 
DoS 99.75 4.78 0.24 
Probe 98.16 1.33 1.83 
U2R 87.09 31.03 12.9 
DoS-Probe 99.33 18.5 0.66 
R2L 98.99 9 1.01 
Overall 81.96 8.51 18.03 
 
 Radial Basis function (RBF) is another feed forward neural network. It classifies by 
taking a measurement of the distance between the inputs and the centre of hidden 
neurons [118]. Figure 4.2 is an RBF architecture showing the input nodes, one hidden 
nodes and output. Each RBF has different parameters with an input vector. The 
network output is thus a linear combination of the radial basis function’s output. The 
input and hidden nodes weights are always 1 since the transfer function of the 
network is a Radial basic function. This allows an adjustment on the weight between 
the hidden nodes and the output [123].  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Radial basis function architecture 
C.Zhang et al.[124] compared the performance of RBF and MLP-BP in detection 
detecting four different types of attacks on KDD Cup’99 dataset. Both training and 
testing data contained 1000 records which were selected from the dataset. In this 
experiment each sample was unique with 34 numerical features and 7 symbolic 
features. The symbolic features were converted to ASCII numbers before being used 
as training or testing data. The results showed RBF achieved better performance than 
MLP-BP with a detection rate of 99.2% and false positive rate of 1.2%. MLP-BP 
showed a detection rate of 93.7% and false positive rate of 7.2%. 
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Ju Jiang et al. [125]applied RBF and Back propagation algorithm (BPL) to both 
misuse and anomaly detection. The experiment was performed on KDD Cup ‘99 
dataset containing 4,900,000 records categorised into 5 (normal, probe attacks, DoS 
attacks, R2L attacks and U2R attacks). The misuse detection network had 41 input 
features, 4 hidden nodes and 4 output nodes representing normal probe, DoS and R2L 
classes respectively. The anomaly network also had 41input features, 1 hidden node 
and 1 output node to classify normal and attacks behaviour. The experimental results 
showed in misuse detection, RBF based IDS performed similarly to BPL based IDS. 
However RBF used a shorter time in training as compared to BPL based IDS and 
needed to adjust its decision thresholds. In anomaly detection, the BPL based IDS had 
to adjust itself output threshold manually according to the characteristics of the 
training dataset to achieve best performance. In anomaly detection RBF based IDS 
out performed BPL based IDs.  
Bi Jing et al. [123] compared RBF and MLP-BP using a processed KDD Cup ’99 
dataset by converting al strings to numeric , reducing the dimension of the dataset  
and determining the rational value domain. The features were reduced from 41 to 31 
to train both RBF and MLP-BP. The RBF structure used had one hidden layer and 
output neuron being the weighted sum of all the output items of the hidden layer. The 
simulation results showed RBF network is better than MLP-BP in its property of 
having a more regular out with shorter training time and better accuracy in attack 
detection. 
4.1.2 Unsupervised learning 
In unsupervised learning, the neural network is only provided with input data without 
conceptualising the output: it discovers patterns within the data autonomously. The data yet 
to be discovered is called unlabelled data [120]. Two typical unsupervised learning are Self-
Organisation Maps (SOMs) and Adaptive Resonance theory (ART). 
 Self-Organisation Maps 
SOMs transform the input of a network into two dimensional feature maps based on 
the topological properties of SOMs. The computation of feature maps is by Kohonen 
unsupervised learning. The two dimensional feature maps are neurons represented by 
coloured squares showing the weights corresponding to each neuron. The inputs are 
grouped based on their similarity. The more features mapped, the bigger the coloured 
square. The quality is determined by the back ground colouring of the clusters. 
Anomaly events can thus be identified by analysing the normal and abnormal events 
from the mapping [118], [126]. 
SOMs are widely used anomaly detection systems. P. Lichodajewski et al. in [127] 
applied SOMs as a Host based intrusion detection system. In this work SOM was 
trained with an explicit coding of data and gave a clear clustering of abnormal 
behaviours. 
In [128], H. Gunes Kayacik et al. investigated and  demonstrated with hierarchical 
SOM architecture with two basic feature sets , one limited to 6 basic features with the 
others containing all 41-features. The results gave a false positive rate of 1.38% and 
detection rate of 90.4%. 
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V. Kumar  et al in [129] presented a unified framework on SOM. Their approach 
detected attacks on a mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) using different parameters. 
Their experimental results were found to be better than other neural network 
approaches in terms of detection rate and false alarm rate. 
 
 Adaptive resonance Theory (ART) 
ART as a basic theory is an unsupervised learning model but as a hybrid it performs 
supervised learning. It functions as a pattern recognition and predictive tool. As an 
unsupervised learning model, ART-1, ART-2, ART-3 and fuzzy Art makes the list. 
The supervised models are made up of ARTMAP, Fuzzy ARTMAP and Gaussian 
ARTMAP [118]. The model compares an input vector to a single neuron’s weight 
(weight vector) [118], [126]. 
In [130], M. Chauhan et al. presented a novel technique by uploading the weights of 
the network based on sign of an evaluation function [131]. An appropriate evaluation 
function was selected by utilizing the probabilities of various states. It concludes that 
if the weights in a modified ART network are oscillating, it implies an intrusion and 
thus the ART network has the capability of detecting any intrusion. 
A hybrid method by P. Somwang et al. in [132] used principal component analysis 
(PCA) and fuzzy adaptive resonance theory  to identify different attacks on KDD Cup 
’99 data set. The results showed a high performance of detection rate of 96.13% and a 
false alarm rate of 3.86% of anomaly intrusion detection. 
4.1.3 Summary 
I. Ahmad et al. in [133]  evaluated SOMs, ART and MLP-BP in terms of main criteria and 
sub-criteria using analytic Hierarchy. Evaluation based on main criteria investigated less 
overhead, maturity, competency, performance and suitability. Sub-criteria investigated cost 
effective, time saving, detection rate, minimum false positive, minimum false negative, 
handling varied intrusion and handling coordinated intrusion. Different radar graphs with 
distinct colours were used for the analysis.  
Analysing MLP-BP and SOM showed MLP-BP had a better detection rate, minimum false 
positive, minimum false negative, time saving and cost effective. In the case of less overhead 
and capability of handling coordinated and varied intrusion, MLP-BP was not as good as 
SOM. Analysing MLP-BP and ART showed the same results. 
A comparison of ART and SOM showed better results for SOM in terms of less overhead and 
handling coordinated intrusion. In another scenario ART was better than SOM in terms of 
detection rate, minimum false negative, maturity, time saving and cost effective. 
In conclusion, a hybrid ANN approach was found to be the most suitable intrusion detection 
system in terms of detection rate, false positive, false negative, cost and time saving. 
4.2 Deep Networks 
This section focuses on networks that look like the multilayer perceptron (MLP) but have a 
different architecture. The difference between the MLP and the deep networks is their 
training procedures. This is a class of ML techniques where classification is conducted by 
training data with many layers in hierarchical networks with unsupervised learning. Deep 
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networks are inspired by the architecture depth of the brain. In 2006, Hinton et al. from the 
university of Toronto came up with Deep Belief Network (DBN) [134]. They trained data 
with an algorithm that greedily trains layer by layer using unsupervised learning for each 
layer of Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) [135]. After this discovery by Hinton et al. 
other deep networks have been introduced using the same principle have been successful in 
classification task [136]. Deep networks IDS can be classified based on how the architectures 
and techniques are being used. Figure 4.3 shows a classification of Deep networks IDS. 
 
Figure 4.3 Classification of deep learning IDS 
4.2.1 Generative Architecture 
Generative models are also referred to as graphical model because they depict 
independence/dependence for distribution. They are visualised as graphs that have nodes 
representing random variables and arcs show the relationship between random variables that 
can have millions of parameters to graphically represent the given system [136], [137]. The 
joint statistical distribution of the variables can be written as products of the nodes and their 
associated variables [136], [138]. The graphical models have hidden variables that cannot be 
observed. Generative models are associated with supervised learning since their training does 
not depend on the labels of the data. For classification purposes the models goes through a 
pre-training stage (unsupervised learning). During this process, each of the lower layers are 
trained separately from the other layers which allows the other layers to be trained in a 
greedily layer by layer from bottom to up. All other layers are trained after pre-training [136]. 
The sub-classes of generative models are Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), Deep Auto-
Encoder, Deep Boltzmann Machine (DBM) and Deep Believe networks (DBN). 
 Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) 
RNN is a class of deep networks that are either considered supervised or unsupervised 
learning with an input sequential data whose length could be as large as its depth 
[139]. The RNN model architecture is a feedback loop linking layer by layer with the 
ability to store data of previous input increasing the reliability of the model [140]. 
There are two types on the RNN in terms of architecture: Elman and Jordan RNNs. 
The Elman model has a simple feedback looping layer by layer. The Jordan model has 
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a feedback looping all neurons within a layer to the next layer. There exists also a 
feedback connecting a neuron to itself. The ability of the Jordan RNN to store 
information in the neurons allows it to train less input vector for classification of 
normal and abnormal patterns with high accuracy [140]. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 are 
simple architectures of the Elman RNN and Jordan RNN showing the context unit 
known to store information of the previous output of hidden layer. 
                                                               
 
Figure 4.4 Jordan Network 
 
Figure 4.5 Elman Network 
A study by K. Jihyun et al. [141] applied long short term memory (LSTM) 
architecture to RNN and trained the IDS using KDD Cup ‘99 dataset.  By comparing 
the accuracy with other IDS classifiers, LSTM-RNN recorded 96.93% accuracy with 
a detection rate of 98.88%. Although the FAR was slightly higher than the others, 
they concluded its overall performance was the best.  
 Deep Auto-Encoder 
These are energy based deep models classified as generative models in their original 
form. It comes in different forms mostly also generative models. Other forms are 
stacked auto encoder and de noising auto encoder a [138]. 
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An Auto-Encoder becomes deep when it has multiple hidden layers. It is made up of 
an input layer unit representing the sample data, one or two hidden layer units where 
the features are transformed and then mapped to the output layer unit for 
reconstruction. Training the auto-encoder gives it a “bottleneck” structure where the 
hidden layer becomes narrower than the input layer to prevent the model from 
learning its identity function [120]. 
 
Figure 4.6 Deep auto encoder 
 
Unfortunately, the deep auto encoder when trained with back propagation has not 
been a success the evaluation gets stuck in local minima with a minimal gradient 
signal when trained with back propagation. Pre-training a deep auto encoder using the 
greedy layer wise approach by training each of the layers in turns has proven to 
alleviate the backpropagation problems [120], [139],[142]. 
In [143], B. Abolhasanzadeh proposed an approach to detect attacks in big data using 
deep auto encoder. The experiment was conducted on NSL-KDD data set to test the 
method of applying bottle neck features in dimensionality reduction as part of 
intrusion detection. The results in terms of accuracy rate out performed PCA, factor 
analysis and Kernel/PCA. It was concluded; the results recorded in terms of accuracy 
makes this approach promising one for real world intrusion detection. 
 Deep Boltzmann Machine(DBM) 
DBM is a unidirectional graphical model. Currently there exist no connection between 
units on the same layer but between the input units and the hidden units. DBM when 
trained with a large supply of  unlabelled data and fine-tuned with labelled data acts 
as a good classifier [136]. Its structure is an offspring of a general Boltzmann machine 
(BM) which is a network of units based on stochastic decisions to determine their on 
and off states [138]. BM algorithm is simple to train but turns to be slow in the 
process. A reduction in the number of hidden layers of a DBM to one forms a 
Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) [139]. DBM when trained with a large supply 
of unlabelled data and fine-tuned with labelled data acts a good classifier. Training a 
stack of RBM with many hidden layers using the feature activation on one RBM as 
the input for the next layer leads to the formation of Deep Believe Network (DBN). 
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Figure 4.7 Left: A Boltzmann machine with stochastic on and off hidden features and 
a variable layer representing a vector of stochastic on and off states. Right: An RBM 
with no visible to visible units connected and no hidden to hidden units connected. 
U. Fiore et al. in [144]explored RBM in anomaly detection by training a network with 
real world data traces from a 24hour work station traffic. This experiment was to test 
the accuracy of RBM to classify normal data and data infected by bot. a second 
experiment trained RBM with KDD Cup ‘99 data set and tested against real world 
data. To randomize the order of test data, the experiment was repeated 10times. The 
experiment confirmed testing a classifier in two different networks training data 
affects the performance. They suggested the nature of anomalous traffic and normal 
traffic should be investigated. 
 Deep Belief Networks (DBN) 
DBN uses both unsupervised pre training and supervised fine-tuning techniques to 
construct the models.  Figure 4.8 shows a DBN which is made up of a stack of 
Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBMs) and one or more additional layers for 
discrimination task. RBMs are probabilistic generative models that learn a joint 
probability distribution of observed (training) data without using data labels. Once the 
structure of a DBN is determined the goal for training is to learn the weights 𝑤 
between layers. Each node is independent of other nodes in the same layer given all 
nodes which gives it the characteristic allowing us to train the generative weights of 
each RBM [120]. It then goes through a greedy layer by layer learning algorithm 
which learns each stack of RBM’s layer at a time. In Figure 4.8 left, the top layers in 
red form a RBM and the lower layers in blue form directed sigmoid believe network 
[145]. 
 
Figure 4.8 Three layer Deep Belief network and three layers deep Boltzmann machine 
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DBN has been trained as a classifier by N. Gao et al. [146] to detect intrusion by 
comparing the performance to SVM and ANN. The classifiers were trained on KDD 
data set. The authors proved that deep learning of DBN can successfully be used as an 
effective ID. They concluded the greedy layer by layer learning algorithm when used 
to pre-train and fine-tune a DBN gives a high accuracy in classification. The results 
showed that DBN recorded the best accuracy of 93.49%, a TP value of 92.33 and FP 
of 0.76%. 
Z. Alom et al.[147] also exploited the DBNs capabilities to detect intrusion through 
series of experiments. The authors trained DBN with NSL-KDD data to identify 
unknown attack on it. They concluded by proposing DBN as a good IDS based on an 
accuracy of 97.5% achieved in the experiment. This results was compared with 
existing DBN-SVM and SVM classifiers which it out performed. 
4.2.1 Discriminative Architecture 
The discriminative architecture uses discriminative power for classification by characterising 
the posterior distributions of classes conditioned on the input data. Recurrent neural network 
and convolutional neural network are two types of discriminative architecture.  
 Recurrent neural network (RNN) uses discriminative power for classification when 
the model’s output is an explicit labelled data in sequence with the input data 
sequence. To train RNN as a discriminative model, training data needs to be pre-
segmented and a post-processing to transform the output to a labelled data [138]. 
 Convolutional neural network 
A convolutional neural network (CNN) is a type of discrimination deep architecture 
with one or more convolutional and pooling layers in an array to form a multilayer 
neural network [139],[148],[149]. In general, convolutional layers share many 
weights followed by sampling of the convolutional layer’s output by the pooling layer 
which results in some form of translational invariant properties [139]. 
CNN has fewer parameters as compared to other connected networks with the same 
number of hidden units which gives it an advantage of easier training [148]. CNN 
architecture is that of multi-layer perceptron [150], and are variant of MLP which are 
inspired biologically. Hubel and Wiesel worked on the cat’s visual cortex and 
deduced that visual cortex is made up of an arrangement of cells in a complex 
manner. These cells are sensitive to small sub-regions of the visual field known as the 
receptive field. These fields are positioned to shield the entire visual field to enable 
the cell behave just like a local filter over the input space [151]. The series of layers 
making up a CNN architecture are the convolutional layer, max pooling layer and the 
fully connected layer [150], [152]. The convolutional layer is made up of neurons 
forming a rect6angular grid where previous layers are made of neuros shaped as a 
rectangular grid. The rectangular grid neurons are connected to each other with the 
inputs from previous rectangular units through a set of weights known as filter banks 
[149], [152]. These weights for the rectangular units do not change for every 
rectangular grid of neuron to form convolutional layers. In architectures where the 
convolutional layer is made up of different grids [152], each grid uses a different filter 
bank [149], [153]. Each convolutional layer is followed by a pooling layer which 
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merges subsets of the convolutional layer’s rectangular block by taking sub-samples 
to give an output of the block. The pooling can be done in several ways such as [152] 
computing the maximum or average or a learned linear summing of neurons in the 
blocks. Some blocks turn to be shifted more than a row or a column and in turn feed 
in an s input to neighbouring pooling units. This causes a reduction in the dimension 
of the system design and thus causing variations to the input [149], [153]. The final 
stage which has several convolutional and max-pooling layers non-linearly stacked in 
the neural network form a fully connected layer of network [152]. The connectivity 
which allows the set of weights of the filter banks to be trained easily [149], [152]. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Image of CNN showing layers making up architecture [154]                                        
5.0 Conclusion 
Shallow and deep networks intrusion detection systems have gained a considerable interest 
commercially and amongst the research community. With advancement in data sizes, 
intrusion detection systems should have the characteristics to handle noisy data with high 
accuracy in detection with high computational speed. This paper gives an overview of the 
general classification of intrusion detection systems and taxonomy with recent and past 
works. This taxonomy gives a clear description of intrusion detection system and its 
complexity. 
Current studies of deep learning intrusion detection systems have been reviewed in this paper 
to help address the challenges in this new technique still in its early stages in intrusion 
detection. In particular recent papers have been reviewed in this work considering all the 
machine learning techniques including the single and hybrid techniques.   
The scope of the work on classifying intrusion detection systems, reviewing the various 
methods of detecting anomaly, performance of these methods were based on past and recent 
works revealing the advantages and disadvantages of each of them. 
The focus of the paper on shallow and deep networks described experiments comparing the 
performance of these learning algorithms. The experiments demonstrated deep networks 
significantly outperformed the shallow network in detection of attacks.  
To the best of our knowledge CNN has not been exploited in the field of intrusion detection 
but has proven to be a good classifier. DBN is also new in its exploitation in this field and 
experimental works are still in progress to determine the reliability of these learning 
algorithms to detect attacks.   
Signature based technique have been in use commercially but have not been able to detect all 
types of attacks especially if the IDS signature list did not contain the right signature. 
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Research work is in progress experimenting new approaches to test the reliability and 
efficiency of knowledge based and behavioural approaches in intrusion detection.   
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